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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Plainti.ff, 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20150492 
v. 
DENNIS TERRY WYNN, 
Appellant/Defendant. 
TURISDICTION 
-
Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-5-103(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
from a court of record in a criminal case involving second and third degree felony 
convictions. Wynn timely filed the notice of appeal on June 7, 2015 (R. 515-16), following 
the court's signing of the final order on May 12, 2015 (R. 509), and e-filing of the same on 
May 13, 2015 (R. 510) . 
ISSUES~ STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Wynn Utah R. Crim. P. 30(6) relief from the 
default restitution order? 
In addressing denial of relief under Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b), this Court generally 
focuses on 
"(1) whether the order or judgment that was rendered reflects what was done or 
intended, (2) whether the error is the result of judicial reasoning and decision making, 
and (3) whether the error is clear from the record." 
State v. Perkins, 2014 UT App 60, ,I 10,322 P.3d 1184 (quoting State v. Rodrigues, 2009 
UT 62, ,I 14,218 P.3d 610). Particularly because the trial court held no evidentiary hearing 
and premised its ruling on the same written record that is before this Court (R. 508), the trial 
court was not in any advantaged position that would justify any deference to the court's 
consideration of these factors. See,~, Mosier v. Gilmore, 635 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1981) 
(recognizing that the normal deference due to trial judges is not properly afforded in 
instances wherein the lower court was merely interpreting the same documents available to 
the appellate court). 
In addressing this issue and others in this case, Wynn at times challenges factual 
assertions in the trial court ruling. As the court held no evidentiary hearing and premised its 
ruling on what it read in the court record that is before this Court, it does not appear that the 
standard deference due to factual findings should apply. See Mosier, supra. Out of an 
abundance of caution, however, when it is possible to do so, counsel for Wynn will establish 
that instances of the trial court's misreadings of the written·record are clearly erroneous, and 
will marshal the evidence that supports the misreadings in proving them clearly erroneous. 
See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,I,I 41-42, 326 P .3d 645 (recognizing the "healthy dose of 
deference" due to factual findings and that marshaling the evidence is a means of carrying 
the burden of persuasion to prove the findings clearly erroneous). 
The issue was preserved (R. 440-444, 4 77-83; R. 544: passim; R. 501-09). 
2. Did the court err in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to grant Wynn relief from the 
default restitution order and illegally imposed sentence under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)? 
Jurisdictional issues present questions of law, to be reviewed without deference for 
2 
correctness. E.g., Warner v. Warner, 2014 UT App 16, ,I 14,319 P.3d 711. 
\:IJ This issue was preserved (R. 167-368, 430-439, 430-444, 477-83; R. 544: passim; R. 
501-09). 
3. Did the court err in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to grant Wynn relief from the 
default restitution order and illegally imposed sentence under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(6)? 
Jurisdictional issues present questions of law, to be reviewed without deference for 
1" correctness. E.g., Warnerv. Warner, 2014 UT App 16, ,I 14,319 P.3d 711. 
This issue was preserved (R. 167-368, 430-439, 430-444, 477-83; R. 544: passim; R. 
501-09). 
4. Did the trial court err in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to order the State to 
provide discovery? 
Jurisdictional issues present questions of law, to be reviewed without deference for 
correctness. E.g., Warner v. Warner, 2014 UT App 16, ,I 14,319 P.3d 711. 
This issue was preserved (R. 445-447, 472-76; R. 501-09). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS~ STATUTES AND RULES 
Appendix 1 contains a copy of these provisions of law: Constitution of Utah, Article 
I§ 7; United States Constitution, Amendments VI and XIV,§ 1; Utah R. Civ. P. 60 and 81; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16, 22, and 30; and Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-3-201, 76-3-402, 77-18-1, 77-
38a-302, 78B-9-102 and 78B-9-104. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE~ COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
In August of 2008, Wynn pled guilty to two second degree and two third degree 
felony counts df securities fraud in state court before Judge Reese (R. 126-132). In January 
of 2015, Wynn filed for relief from the default restitution order and the remainder of his 
illegally imposed sentence, under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (R. 167-368, 430-439, 430-439), 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(6) and Utah R. Civ. P. 60(6) (R. 440-444, 477-83; R. 544: passim). Wynn 
also sought discovery to support his claims (R. 445-447, 472-76). 
Judge Parker, who had assumed the caseload of Judge Reese after Judge Reese 
retired, refused to hold an evidentiary hearing and ruled on the merits that there was no 
error in the default restitution order to correct under rule 30(6). He ruled that he had no 
jurisdiction to order the State to grant Wynn relief under rule 22(e) or 60(6) or to compel the 
State to provide discovery (R. 501-09). 
Wynn appealed (R. 515-16). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO APPEAL 
Wynn pled guilty in state and federal criminal prosecutions with the understanding 
shared by his counsel and the state and federal prosecutors that he would be incarcerated 
only in the federal case for the agreed upon five year federal prison sentence, and that his 
state sentence would run concurrently with and not exceed the federal five year sentence (R. 
179-80, 182). Consistent with this agreement, Wynn's plea form averred that "any" state 
prison time on his state second and third degree felony convictions would run concurrently 
4 
{,,, 
\1j.if' 
with his federal prison time (R. 130, 183). To facilitate this agreement, the State judge, 
~ Judge Reese, delayed the imposition of the state sentence until after Wynn went to federal 
prison (R. 543: 3, R. 184). 
Wynn's trial counsel did not protect Wynn from the possibility that he would be 
detained by the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole and held beyond the federal five-year 
sentence for his state second degree felonies. Counsel did not ask Judge Reese for a 
sentence of probation or seek a reduction of the second degree felonies to third degree 
felonies at sentencing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402. Counsel stipulated to 
concurrent state prison terms, to be imposed after Wynn went to federal prison (R. 543: 2-
3). 
During the plea and sentencing hearing,Judge Reese informed Wynn that the judge 
would go along with the plea agreement that he had apparently discussed with counsel at 
some prior time off the record when Wynn was not present This portion of the colloquy 
was as follows: 
I indicated to your attorney and the State's attorney that I would accept their 
sentencing recommendations, so you'll be given a sentence of two counts - on two of 
the counts 1 to 15 years in prison to run concurrently and two other counts zero to 
five years in prison, all counts to run concurrently and to run concurrent with the 
federal time. I've agreed not to issue a commitment until you're scheduled to report 
on your federal commitment. 
I'll also order that you pay full and complete restitution in an amount of at 
least $100,000, but probably as your attorney, I think in his words, were many times 
more than that, but the two of you will agree on a figure that will be presented at the 
time you surrender. Is that what you understand? 
(R. 543: 3). Wynn answered, "Yes, sir." (R. 543: 3). 
There was no agreement by Wynn, either on or off the record, that Wynn would pay 
5 
restitution beyond that owed as a result of counts he pled to (R. 186). The agreement 
pertaining to restitution that was placed on the record was that Wynn would pay $100,000 
toward the state restitution at the time he pled and was sentenced, and that the actual 
amount of restitution would be determined between counsel for the parties by October 6, 
2008, the date that Wynn was to report to federal prison (R. 130, R. 543: 3, 5). 
The default restitution order requires Wynn to pay $782, 036.00 (R. 134-147). This is 
well over the total amount Wynn allegedly collected from all the victims in the State 
prosecution -- $184,526 (R. 13) and did not account for the $100,000 Wynn had paid at the 
time he pled and was sentenced (R. 543: 2-3). The State reached the $782,036.00 figure by 
including payments to twelve people who were not among the victims underlying the 
charges in the State case, and to all the victims named in the state case, including those 
involved in counts to which Wynn did not plead guilty (R. 134-147). 
Wynn's trial counsel failed to object and defaulted on the proposed restitution order 
in state court.1 The prosecution submitted the proposed restitution order in State court on 
October 6, 2008, indicating that as of that date, Wynn's counsel had not responded to the 
proposed order, despite having been served with it on September 19, 2008 (R. 135). It is 
1 Counsel also defaulted on the restitution order in federal court. At the time that 
Wynn pled in federal court, the government contended that Wynn owed $15,202.257.68, but 
the parties and court anticipated that a final amount of restitution would be determined by 
counsel for the parties (R. 183,246, 265-66). Defense counsel repeatedly continued the 
dates for Wynn's federal sentencing and to report to federal prison to facilitate the correct 
ascertainment of restitution (R. 292-314). At the sentencing hearing, counsel represented 
that neither he nor the government had ascertained the restitution amount, and they agreed 
to stipulate to it or hold a hearing before Wynn reported to prison (R. 276-280). Wynn 
eventually self-surrendered to federal prison without counsel acting on or disturbing the 
initial amount of restitution requested by the Government (R. 184). 
6 
clear that the restitution order was entered by default, rather than by determination by 
vJJ counsel as the plea agreement required, because the restitution order requires Wynn to pay 
restitution to people who were not victims of counts to which Wynn pled guilty, and who 
were not listed in the charges at all (R. 134-147), when Wynn had not agreed to pay 
restitution beyond the counts to which he pled (R. 186). That defense counsel abdicated his 
responsibility to advocate for Wynn 'With regard to the restitution order is further evinced by 
the fact that the default restitution order, to which trial counsel did not object, does not 
account for the $100,000 in restitution that Wynn paid when he pled and was sentenced (R. 
543: 2-3). 
Consistent with Judge Reese's voiced expectation that he would be signing a 
stipulated order, the default restitution order that he signed set forth no accounting for the 
court to independently ascertain or justify the amounts sought for each restitution payee (R. 
137-147). Nor did it provide an agreement by Wynn to pay restitution to people in addition 
to those involved in the counts pled to, or any explanation or justification for ordering 
restitution for people who were not victims specified in the charges to which Wynn pied 
guilty (R. 134-147). 
While Wynn was in federal prison serving his five year sentence, the Utah Board of 
Pardons and Parole lodged a detainer on Wynn and had him transported to the state prison 
after he completed his federal five year sentence (R. 184).2 The Board intends to hold 
2 Wynn filed a pro se petition in the trial court trying to vacate the detainer on January 
4, 2011 (R. 148-150). Judge Reese denied this motion (R. 153), and Wynn abandoned his 
efforts to appeal from this ruling (R. 154, 159). 
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Wynn for the entire remainder of the fifteen years for the second degree felony convictions, 
until August 24, 2023, when Wynn will be sixty-nine years old, unless and until he pays off 
his restitution in full, in the amount of $782,068.00 (R. 185, 360-61). While Wynn has an 
offer for a job that pays well and free room and board so he can begin paying restitution 
upon his parole, he has no means to pay restitution while he is incarcerated (R. 186, 366, 
368). 
During Wynn's parole rehearing, on May 2, 2013, the hearing officer asserted that 
Wynn had been ordered to pay twenty separate victims $782,036.00. Wynn said he had not 
seen the figures but thought this was correct, but he noted that he was not given access to 
the information underlying the restitution order.3 
Wynn first obtained a copy of the default restitution order entered by Judge Reese on 
3 The discussion was as follows: 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. So at this point I have restitution is owed in the 
amount of $782,068.63. It says $100,000 of this has been paid, and there's a balance 
of $682,068; is that correct? 
J\ffi.. WYNN: I don't - I haven't seen those figures, it sounds correct. 
HEARING OFFICER: Well, they were in the blue packet 
J\ffi.. WYNN: They're not in the blue packet that I have. They may have been in the 
original blue packet, but that original blue packet was sent -
HEARING OFFICER: Have you paid more than $100,000? 
J\ffi.. WYNN: Not that I'm aware of. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Did you pay the $100,000? 
J\ffi.. WYNN: Yes. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. So as I look over the victims, it looks like there were 
20 separate victims with losses ranging from 7,000 to $107,000 each. 
J\ffi.. WYNN: And I don't have the - I don't have that in my blue packet, so -
Hearing officer: Well, I can't give you the victim's addresses for mailing 
purposes. Okay. So any of that information that you want to add upon, or does that 
pretty well sum it up? 
J\IB.. WYNN: I think that sums it up. 
(R. 339-340). 
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December 15, 2014, after present counsel went to district court to review the record, found 
v, the order, and mailed it to Wynn in the prison on December 9, 2014 (R. 186, R. 544: 5-6, 
18). On January 30, 2015, Wynn moved for relief from his sentence, including the 
restitution order, pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (R. 167-368, 430-439, 430-439). He 
later moved for relief pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 30(6) and Utah R. Civ. P. 60(6) (R. 440-
444, 477-83). He also moved for discovery to support his claims (R. 445-447, 472-76) and 
vJ requested an evidentiary hearing (R. 165, 450, 469-71 ). 
Despite its plea agreement that "any" state prison time for Wynn would run during 
his federal five year sentence, and that Wynn would not serve time in the state prison (R. 
179-80, 182), the Utah Attorney General's Office opposed all of Wynn's efforts to obtain 
relief. The State argued that Judge Parker should hold no evidentiary hearing and had no 
vJ jurisdiction to order the State to provide discovery or any relief from his restitution order or 
the imposition of his sentence, and that Wynn's only remedy was to withdraw his guilty pleas 
through the Post Conviction Remedies Act (R. 393-427, 454-466). 
Judge Parker refused to hold an evidentiary hearing, ruled on the merits that there 
was no error in the default restitution order to be corrected under rule 30(6 ), and ruled that 
he had no jurisdiction to grant Wynn discovery or relief under rules 22(e) and 60(6) or to 
compel the State to provide discovery (R. 501-09). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Wynn is entitled to relief from the default restitution order under Utah R. Crim. P. 
30(6). The intent of the court, Judge Reese, was to sign an order reflecting the agreement of 
Wynn and the State as to the final restitution amount (R. 543: 3, 5). The restitution order 
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the court signed was not agreed to by Wynn, but was a default order that required Wynn to 
pay restitution to people who were not victims of counts he pied to, and were not victims in 
this case at all (R. 134-147). This deviated from Wynn's agreement to pay restitution for the 
counts he pied to (R. 186), and from the law governing re~titution, which requires a 
defendant's agreement before a court may order restitution for criminal conduct other than 
that underlying the convictions. The order also failed to account for the $100,000 in 
restitution paid by Wynn when he pied and was sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement 
(R. 543: 3, 5). Thus, the final order does not square with the intent of Judge Reese to enter 
an order reflecting the agreement of Wynn and the State, and is properly recognized as 
reflecting the State's clerical errors. 
The errors in the final order were not the product of judicial reasoning. Judge Reese 
voiced the intent to sign the order presented to him after the parties agreed to it (R, 543: 3, 
5), and he signed the incorrect default order presented by the State (R. 134-147). He did not 
have sufficient information underlying the restitution order with which he could have 
reasoned to enter the order. 
The errors in the final order are clear. The final order requires Wynn to pay 
restitution to payees in the absence of an agreement by Wynn to pay them (R. 186), and 
whom he is legally not obligated to pay through criminal restitution (R. 134-147). 
Additionally, the default restitution order does not account for or give Wynn credit for the 
$100,000 in restitution he paid at the time he pied and was sentenced pursuant to the plea 
bargain (R. 543: 2-3). As the order clearly deviates from the intent of the court to enter an 
order reflecting the agreement of the parties, it is subject to correction under rule 30(b ). 
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Wynn is entitled to relief from the illegal default restitution order and remainder of 
his illegally imposed sentence under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). The default restitution order is 
clearly illegal under Utah law governing restitution,~' State v. Larsen, 2009 UT App 293, 
221 P.3d 277, and is properly corrected under rule 22(e), as it is part of Wynn's criminal 
sentence,~' Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-3-201 (4) and 77-38a-302(1). 
The illegal default restitution order and the sentence itself were both imposed in 
violation of Wynn's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. It was objectively 
deficient for counsel to fail to protect Wynn from the possibility he would serve a state 
prison sentence, in violation of the agreement of the parties. It was objectively deficient for 
trial counsel to forfeit Wynn's well- established procedural rights to an accurate 
determination of his restitution obligations, and to fail to assert the law forbidding an order 
of restitution that exceeds the guilty pleas and any agreement by Wynn to pay restitution. 
Counsel's forfeiture of Wynn's procedural rights is legally viewed as prejudicial. Counsel's 
deficiencies served no conceivable legitimate strategy and were prejudicial to Wynn. There is 
a reasonable probability of a more favorable result in the absence of counsel's deficient 
performance with regard to the state prison sentence and illegal default restitution order. 
For in the absence of the instances of deficient performance, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that Wynn would not be trapped in the State prison as a result of his inability to earn and pay 
restitution money, and instead would be free and working to pay restitution, as was the 
agreement between him and the prosecution. 
Thus, the illegally imposed sentence is subject to correction under rule 22( e). The 
legal issues before the trial court and this Court require no factual resolution, as the State has 
11 
never contested the facts that are clearly established on the record. Accordingly, rule 22(e) is 
an appropriate rule to remedy the illegalities involved in the imposition of Wynn's sentence. 
Utah R. of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides yet another avenue of relief from trial 
counsel's ineffective assistance in representing Wynn in the sentencing and restitution 
proceedings. Counsel's gross ineffective assistance in representing Wynn in the sentencing is 
properly addressed under 60(b)(6). In seeking this relief, Wynn is not trying to evade the 
requirements of the Post Conviction Remedies Act. He would certainly have grounds to 
withdraw his pleas under the PCRA. But he has already been serving concurrent state prison 
time for more than the agreed-upon five years, and at this point should not be forced to 
withdraw his pleas under the Post Conviction Remedies Act and face re-prosecution in state 
court Rather, he should have full access to relief from the default restitution order and the 
remainder of his illegally imposed sentence under criminal rules 30(b), 22(e) and civil rule 
60(b). 
The trial court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to require the State to provide 
discovery. As explained herein, Criminal Rules 30(b) and 22(e) and Civil Rule 60(b) all 
provided the court with jurisdiction to act on Wynn's case, and the court exercised its 
jurisdiction in reaching the merits of Wynn's 30(b) claim. Consistent with its constitutional, 
rule based, and common law duties to provide discovery on an ongoing basis, the State 
should be required to provide discovery to Wynn on remand. 
I. 
ARGUMENTS 
THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER RELIEF FROM THE CLERICAL 
ERRORS IN THE DEFAULT RESTITUTION ORDER UNDER UTAH 
R. CRIM. P. 30(b). 
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Utah R Crim. P. 30(6) provides: 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court 
at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
The rule gives district courts jurisdiction to make post-judgment corrections of clerical errors 
in criminal cases, and is one exception to the general rule that district courts lose jurisdiction 
over criminal defendants after the entry of their sentences. See State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 
62, ,I 13,218 P.3d 610. 
In Rodrigues, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's use of rule 30(6) to increase 
the amount of restitution, to correct the State's clerical error in a restitution calculation. 
The court first explained that clerical errors that are subject to correction at any time are 
those that reflect an error by a judge, clerk or counsel for one of the parties, such that the 
court order deviates from the intent of the court and/ or the intent of the court and parties. 
Id. at ,I 15. The clerical error inquiry is not focused on whether a clerk or someone else 
made the error and is not used to correct substantive errors resulting from erroneous judicial 
reasoning. Rather, the clerical error doctrine allows correction of orders that do not square 
with the intent of the courts. Id. The Rodrigues court allowed for rule 30(6) correction 
because it recognized that the restitution figure originally provided by the State at sentencing, 
to which the defendant assented at sentencing, and which was then adopted by the court 
without the exercise of judicial reasoning, was not accurate and did not fulfill the intent of 
the parties and court reflected in the plea agreement that defendant would pay all child 
support arrearages in restitution. Id. at ,I,I 16-22. 
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Another example of clerical error is discussed in State v. Perkins, 2014 UT App 60, 
322 P.3d 1184, wherein this Court affirmed the trial court's correction of a defendant's 
sentence so that the final order required his sentences to run consecutively instead of 
concurrently. Even though the trial court at sentencing repeatedly said the sentences were to 
run concurrently, it was permissible for the court to later change the order to consecutive 
sentences because the record showed that the court truly intended to impose consecutive 
sentences in the first place, but misspoke. Id. 
In addressing denial of relief under Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b), this Court generally 
focuses on 
"(1) whether the order or judgment that was rendered reflects what was done or 
intended, (2) whetl1er tl1e error is the result of judicial reasoning and decision making, 
and (3) whether the error is clear from the record." 
State v. Perkins, 2014 UT App 60, ,r 10, 322 P .3d 1184 ( quoting State v. Rodrigues, 2009 
UT 62, ,f 14,218 P.3d 610). 
Particularly because Judge Parker held no evidentiary hearing and premised his ruling 
on the same written record available to this Court (R. 508), the trial court was not in any 
advantaged position that would justify any deference to the trial court's consideration of 
these factors. See,~' Mosier v. Gilmore, 635 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that the 
normal deference due to trial judges is not properly afforded in instances wherein the lower 
court was merely interpreting the same documents available to the appellate court). Thus, 
this Court should address these three factors without deference to the lower court's ruling. 
A. THE DEFAULT RESTITUTION ORDER DOES NOT COMPORT 
WITH THE INTENT OF JUDGE REESE OR THE PARTIES. 
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Judge Parker erred in denying Wynn relief under rule 30(b) on the merits on the 
theory that the restitution order involved no error, and reflected what was intended by the 
parties and the court- that Judge Reese would to enter an order for "'full and complete' 
restitution." (R. 508). 
To the extent that Judge Parker's ruling is viewed as a finding of fact, the following 
discussions between Judge Reese and Wynn and Wynn's trial counsel in the plea and 
sentencing hearing are the only evidence to be marshaled in support thereof: 
I'll also order that you pay full and complete restitution in an amount of at 
least $100,000, but probably as your attorney, I think in his words, were many times 
more than that, but the two of you will agree on a figure that will be presented at the 
time you surrender. Is that what you understand? 
J\,fR. WYNN:Yes, sir. 
(R. 543: 3). 
I'll impose the sentences we agreed to, two 1 to 15s to run concurrent, two 
zero to fives to run concurrent, all sentences to run concurrent with each other on 
the federal sentence. I'll order that full and complete restitution be paid and the 
amount- stipulated amount submitted by October 6th? 
JvlR. RICH [trial counsel for Wynn]: That's correct. Thank you. 
(R. 543: 5). 
These discussions are not properly read as indicating that Judge Reese intenped to 
enter an order for restitution beyond anything that Wynn agreed to. While Judge Reese 
mentioned that Wynn's trial lawyer probably said Wynn owed many times more than 
$100,000, trial counsel's actual comment is not in the record, and may well have been 
referring to the amounts owed in both state and federal court, where Wynn is under another 
default order to pay over fifteen million dollars in restitution. See n. 2, supra. The colloquy 
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demonstrates that Judge Reese intended to order Wynn to pay an amount to be agreed upon 
between Wynn and the State, at the minimum level of $100,000 (R. 543: 3, 5). 
Judge Reese's statements that he would order "ftill and complete restitution" in the 
amount to be stipulated to between the parties of at least $100,000 (R. 543: 3, 5) apparently 
meant that the court would order Wynn to pay the full amount of restitution actually owed 
to the victims of the counts pled to, and would not reduce the amount of restitution that was 
included in the final order. For the Utah Code distinguishes between full restitution, defined 
as "restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant," and 
court-ordered restitution, the amount of restitution finally ordered after the courts consider 
statutory factors such as ability to pay. See Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302(5)(a). 
Particularly because Judge Reese's comments that he would order full and complete 
restitution were couched with his indications that the court expected the restitution figure to 
be agreed upon by the parties, the "full and complete restitution" remark by Judge Reese is 
no substitute for the requisite agreement necessary to justify an order of restitution to 
victims of counts not pled to and to people who were not among the victims charged in the 
case. For our law allows for criminal restitution only for damages from offenses of 
conviction unless there is an agreement by the defendant to pay restitution beyond the 
offenses of conviction. See,~ State v. Larsen, 2009 UT App 293, 221 P.3d 277 (reversing 
restitution order that exceeded defendant's guilty plea and was unsupported by his 
agreement to pay restitution for conduct beyond his guilty plea) and Utah Code Ann.§ 77-
38a-302(1 )("When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
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defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition.") and 
(5)(a) ("For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include 
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the 
defendant agrees to pay restitution."). There was no such agreement that Wynn would pay 
restitution for people not named as victims in the case, or for victims in counts to which he 
did not plead guilty (R. 186). 
Judge Parker's finding that there was "no indication in the record that the intent of 
the court and the parties was not carried out in the Order of restitution" (R. 508) is clearly 
erroneous. Because it is phrased in the negative, evidence cannot be marshaled in support of 
the finding. There is evidence that the restitution order does not comport with the intent of 
the parties, as Wynn's declaration evinces that he did not agree to pay restitution beyond 
what he owed to the victims of counts pled to (R. 186). The State never produced any 
evidence that Wynn had entered into such an agreement. The prosecutors refused to 
provide discovery, and took the position that Judge Parker had no authority to order the 
State to provide discovery (R. 454-55). Trial counsel for Wynn and the actual trial 
prosecutor did not respond to present counsel's inquiries (R. 544: 7). 
The record reflects Judge Reese's intention to order restitution as it was determined 
between the attorneys for the State and Wynn (R. 130, R. 543: 5), and Wynn did not agree to 
pay restitution to people other than the victims of the counts pled to (R. 186). Additionally, 
the default restitution order does not account for or give Wynn credit for the $100,000 in 
restitution he paid at the time he pled and was sentenced with the expectation articulated on 
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the record at the time he pled that the $100,000 would be credited toward the restitution 
owed (R. 543: 2-3). 
Thus the order does not comport with Judge Reese's or the parties' intentions. 
Because the default restitution order submitted to Judge Reese did not square with 
Wynn's agreement, the order did not conform to the plea agreement or the court's intention. 
As in Rodrigues, the State's clerical error may and should be corrected under rule 30(6). 
Wynn qualifies for relief under the first prong of the 30(6) test, see Perkins, supra, as the 
default restitution order did not reflect the agreement of the parties, as Judge Reese intended 
(R. 543: 3, 5). 
B. THE ERRORS IN THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WERE NOT 
THE PRODUCT OF JUDICIAL REASONING. 
Judge Reese never intended to engage in judicial reasoning in arriving at the 
restitution order. Rather, he anticipated that the parties would stipulate to the amount of 
restitution owed by the time that Wynn surrendered to federal prison, and that Judge Reese 
would order the full and complete amount of restitution specified by the order to be agreed 
upon and submitted by the parties (R. 543: 3, 5). Consistent with this plan, there was no 
judicial reasoning behind the restitution order. It was simply put before the court by the 
Attorney General's Office, defaulted on by trial counsel for Wynn, and signed by Judge 
Reese. Judge Reese necessarily did not reason before he signed the default order that was 
inaccurately calculated by the prosecution as he had no underlying data with which to 
calculate the amounts owed, particularly with regard to the twelve payees who were not 
victims of any charged count. Compare information and probable cause statement listing 
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amounts owed to charged victims (R. 1-38) with final order of restitution listing amounts to 
<@ be paid to all charged victims and several other people not included in the charges (R. 134-
14 7). Additionally, the default restitution order does not account for or give Wynn credit for 
the $100,000 in restitution he paid at the time he pied and was sentenced (R. 543: 2-3). The 
intent of the parties and court was that the $100,000 payment was part of Wynn's payment 
of restitution in the criminal case (R. 543: 2-3). 
As was clear in Rodrigues, the record demonstrates that Judge Reese intended to 
impose restitution in accordance with the plea agreement. Cf. Rodrigues at ,r 19 ("TI1e 
district court's statements at the sentencing hearing further demonstrate that it intended to 
order restitution in accordance with the plea agreement."). It is equally clear that the 
restitution order is not the product of determination by counsel but was instead a default 
order that holds Wynn accountable for hundreds of thousands of dollars in restitution to 
people whose allegations did not result in convictions, or even charges in multiple instances, 
and that because there was no agreement by Wynn to pay restitution to these people (R. 
186), as the law would require. See,~' Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302; State v. Larsen, 2009 
UT App 293,221 P.3d 277 (reversing restitution order that exceeded defendant's guilty plea 
and was unsupported by his agreement to pay restitution for conduct beyond his guilty plea), 
supra. Thus, the restitution order does not square with the intent of the parties as to the 
amount of restitution owed, and as to Wynn's entitlement for credit for the $100,000 he paid 
toward restitution (R. 543: 3). As in Rodrigues, the trial court was not the source of these 
errors. Instead, the court merely adopted the State's improperly calculated restitution award. 
Wynn qualifies for relief under the second prong of the test for relief under rule 
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30(6), see Perkins. Because Judge Re~se did not enter the default restitution order through 
the exercise of judicial reasoning. the default order should be corrected as the State's clerical 
error under rule 30(6). See Rodrigues, supra. 
C. THE ERRORS ARE CLEAR FROM THE RECORD. 
As detailed above, the erroneous nature of the default restitution order is clear from 
the record, for it does not reflect the agreement of Wynn, one of the two parties who should 
have been in agreement before the court signed the order. The order purports to require 
Wynn to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in restitution to people who are not victims 
in the case, and to people who are victims of counts to which Wynn did not plead guilty (R. 
134-147), in the absence of an agreement by Wynn to accept responsibility to pay restitution 
to people in addition to those involved in the counts to which he pled guilty (R. 186). The 
order thus deviates from the intent of the parties, and thereby deviates from the intent of 
Judge Reese to enter an order reflecting the parties' agreement (R. 543: 3, 5). The order also 
deviates from the law that limits criminal restitution to that attributable to the offenses of 
conviction unless there is an agreement by the defendant to pay more. E.g. Larsen, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302, supra. The order is further clearly erroneous because it does not 
account for or give Wynn credit for the $100,000 in restitution he had paid at the time he 
pied and was sentenced (R. 543: 3). 
Judge Parker's ruling reads as if all restitution payees were among the named victims 
underlying the counts in this case (R. 506). This is clearly erroneous. There is evidence to 
marshal in support of the finding, as each count in the information and probable cause 
statement lists a victim or victims (R. 1-38), and Wynn pied guilty to counts 1, 2, 5 and 7 (R. 
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126). According to the Information the victims of Count 1 were Vicki and Mark Fleming 
~ (R. 2); the victims of Count 2 were K. and Faye Brady (R. 2); the victim of Count 5 was 
Greg Cassat (R. 3); and the victims of Count 7 were Ryan and Peggy Stephenson (R. 4). 
In addition to ordering payment of restitution to the victims of the counts pled to, the 
default restitution order listed the following payees who were listed as victims of counts not 
pled to: Dave Cassity (R. 145), Eugene Garrett (R. 146), Teri Hunt (R. 146), and Mark 
~ Sanderson (R. 147). The clearly erroneous nature of the ruling is readily established because 
twelve of the restitution payees in the order of restitution are not named in any count (R. 
141-147). The default restitution order listed the following payees who were not victims of 
any charged counts: Scott Barnes (R. 145), Ryan Fish (R. 145), Wade Frey (R. 145), Kory 
Koontz (R. 146), Betty Little (R. 146), Brook Neff (R. 146), Quinn Perez (R. 146), Zandra 
i.@ Perkins (R. 146), Marcello Surjopolos (R. 14 7), Simon Timms (R. 14 7), Patricia Tueller (R 
147), and Fred Wagner (R. 147). 
Judge Parker described the restitution order as requiring payment of $782,068, and 
then followed that figure with this parenthetical comment "(the original $100,000 plus an 
additional $682,068)". The parenthetical comment is clearly erroneous, and there is no 
evidence to marshal in support of the suggestion that the order accounts for Wynn's 
$100,000 payment The order actually requires Wynn to pay a total of $728,068 does not 
account for and makes no mention of the original $100,000 payment (R. 141-43). The ruling 
thus deviates from the intent of the parties that Wynn would be credited for the $100,000 
payment he made when he pled (R. 543: 3, 5). 
Contrary to Judge Parker's ruling, the default restitution order does contain errors, 
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and they are clear from the record. Thus, Wynn qualifies for relief under the third prong of 
the test and thus are subject to correction under 30(6). See Rodrigues and Perkins. 
Assuming that Wynn must show prejudice - that there was a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable result absent the errors at issue, State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 106 (Utah 
1988), Wynn has carried this burden. The current order for ~ynn to pay $782,068 is far in 
excess of the total amount of money Wynn owes to the victims of the counts of conviction, 
apparently $138,116.18 (R. 16-23), far in excess of the total money all the victims in the State 
case invested with Wynn -- $184,526 (R. 13), and does not reflect the $100,000 he paid back 
at the time of his plea and sentencing (R. 543: 2-3). 
Had trial counsel not forfeited Wynn's rights to proper resolution of his restitution 
obligations, and had counsel taken reasonable steps to ensure that the parties' agreement that 
"any" state time would run concurrently with Wynn's federal five year sentence, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that Wynn would not be residing in the Utah State Prison at all, let 
alone with a current parole date of August 24, 2023, unless he is able to produce and pay 
$782,068.00. Rather, there is a reasonable likelihood that he would have been free, working, 
and paying restitution, as was contemplated in the agreement between Wynn, his counsel, 
and the state and federal prosecutors (R. 179-187). 
This Court should reverse Judge Parker's order and remand this matter to him for 
correction of the default restitution order. See Perkins and Rodrigues, supra. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER RELIEF UNDER UTAH R. CRIM. P. 
22(e) FROM THE DEFAULT RESTITUTION ORDER AND ILLEGAL 
IMPOSITION OF WYNN'S SENTENCE. 
A. WYNN IS ENTI1LED TO RELIEF UNDER 22(e). 
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Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22( e) provides that "[t]he court may correct an 
\@ illegal se~tence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." The rule provides 
continuing jurisdiction in trial and appellate courts to correct illegally imposed sentences, 
regardless of whether proper objections were raised in the trial courts, because illegal 
sentences are void. See,~' State v. Lee, 2011 UT App 356, ,r 8,264 P.3d 239. 
Unconstitutional sentences are subject to correction under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
\f/1 22(e). E.g., State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ,r 11, 232 P.3d 1008 (reaching merits of 
substantive due process challenge to sentence); State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ,r 5, 48 P.3d 
228 (reaching merits of Eighth Amendment and separation of powers challenges to 
sentence); reaching merits of Eighth Amendment and separation of powers challenges to 
sentence); State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15,274 P.3d 919 (reaching merits of double jeopardy 
challenge to sentence); State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ,r,r 29-68, 2015 UT LEXIS 129 
(rejecting six constitutional challenges to sentence under 22(e)). Rule 22(e) challenges are 
improper if they are "as applied" challenges, such that they are truly attempts to challenge 
the underlying conviction. Id. at ,r 26. 
Here, in contrast to the State's efforts to push this case into the PCRA for withdrawal 
of Wynn's pleas, Wynn, who has been serving concurrent time since October 9, 2008 on 
what he expected to be a five year state and federal sentence, is trying to correct his sentence 
while leaving his pleas, plea bargain, and convictions intact (R. 544: 16). As is explained 
herein, because his sentence was imposed through ineffective assistance of counsel, it was 
illegally imposed, and subject to correction under the plain language of rule 22(e). Further, 
as the restitution order that was part of Wynn's sentence,~' Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-3-201 
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(4) and 77-38a-302(1), and was manifestly and patently illegal as it far exceeded Wynn's legal 
responsibility for restitution,~, Larsen, it is subject to correction under 22(e). 
All criminal defendants have statutory and state and federal constitutional due 
process rights to accuracy in sentencing. See~ State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 
(Utah 1993), and Utah Code Ann.§ 77-18-1(6)(a). Sentences that are premised on 
information that is not reasonably reliable and accurate violate due process of law and are 
unconstitutional under Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution. E.g.:- State v. Wanosik, 2001 
UT App 241, ,r 34, 31 P.3d 615. They also violate the Federal Constitution and the Utah 
Code. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993); Utah Code Ann.§ 77-18-1(6)(a). 
Additionally, the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies at 
sentencing, Wanosik at ,r 25. Thus, if counsel fails to ensure that a sentence is premised on 
reasonably reliable and accurate information, the Utah and Federal Constitutions are 
violated. See id. ,r,r 25, 34. See also State v. Udy, 2012 UT App 244, ,r 286 P.3d 345 
(quoting Candedo at ,r9 for the proposition that "[[T]he definition of illegal sentence under 
rule 22( e) is sufficiently broad to include constitutional violations that threaten the validity of 
the sentence."'). 
Wynn's sentence is unconstitutional as it is the product of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. To establish a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Wynn 
must identify the specific acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, which cannot be justified as conceivable reasonable strategy. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984). He must show "a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
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different" Id. at 687. 
In proving deficient performance, Wynn must show that "on the basis of the law in 
effect at the time of trial, his ... trial counsel's performance was deficient." State v. Dunn, 850 
~ P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). He must rebut the strong presumption that the lawyers' 
actions under the circumstances then prevailing might be viewed as reasonable trial strategy, 
by convincing the Court that there was no conceivable reasonable trial strategy to justify the 
actions. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,I 6, 89 P.3d 162. Actual 
tactical decisions reflected in the record are still reviewed for reasonableness. State v. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989). 
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all 
issues in the trial court so that court is given an ample opportunity to avoid errors as the case 
progresses. See,~, State v. Smedley. 2003 UT App 79 at ,I 10, 67 P.3d 1005. When a 
defense lawyer fails to assert beneficial, current law, this constitutes objectively deficient 
performance, which will not be excused by the courts with hypothetical tactical reasons. See, 
State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989) (tt-ial counsel's failure to seek jury 
instruction reflecting current law beneficial to the client was objectively deficient oversight of 
the law, which could not conceivably have been valid trial strategy). 
Wynn's sentence is also unconstitutional because the restitution ordered is inaccurate, 
and trial counsel was ineffective in entirely forfeiting Wynn's right to an accurate 
determination of restitution in the state case. Restitution is generally considered part of the 
sentence in criminal cases. See~, Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-3-201 (4) and 77-38a-302(1). 
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While the exact amount of restitution was specified in the default order submitted after 
sentencing, restitution was ordered as part of Wynn's sentence (R. 543: 3, 5). 
It is axiomatic that restitution is to be entered for offenses of conviction and any 
other sums the defendant agrees to pay. See,~' Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302; State v. 
Larsen, 2009 UT App 293, 221 P.3d 277 (reversing restitution order that exceeded 
defendant's guilty plea and was unsupported by his agreement to pay restitution for conduct 
beyond his guilty plea). In the instant matter, the state prosecutor submitted a restitution 
request that not only encompassed restitution for the counts Wynn pled to, but also, 
encompassed restitution for dismissed counts, and for other people who were not tied to any 
count at all (R. 134-147). As there was no conviction or agreement by Wynn to pay 
restitution for anything beyond the counts he pied to (R. 186), trial counsel should have 
objected to the restitution request, which exceeded what Wynn was legally required to pay by 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. See Larsen. 
There is no legitimate strategic justification for counsel's forfeiting Wynn's right to an 
accurate restitution determination, for this in no way served Wynn's interests. As a result of 
trial counsel's inaction, Wynn was ultimately ordered to pay hundreds of thousands of 
dollars more than the total amount of money from all of the investors in the state case. 
When an attorney entirely forfeits a criminal defendant's procedural rights, this is 
ineffective assistance as a matter oflaw, as prejudice is presumed. See,~' Williams v. 
Tavlor, 529 U.S. 362, 392-93 (2000); Hill v. Locka!t, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985); Menzies v. 
Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,I,I 99-100, 150 P.3d 480. 
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Assuming that Wynn must show prejudice - that there was a reasonable likelihood of 
(.cl) a more favorable result absent the errors at issue, State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 106 (Utah 
1988), Wynn has carried this burden. The current order for Wynn to pay $782,068 is far in 
excess of the total amount of money Wynn owes to the victims of the counts of conviction, 
apparently $138,116.18 (R. 1-38), and far in excess of the total amount of money people in 
the State case invested with Wynn -- $184,526 (R. 13), and does not reflect the $100,000 he 
paid back at the time of his plea and sentencing (R. 543: 2-3). 
Trial counsel's performance was equally deficient and prejudicial with regard to the 
imposition of the state sentence with regard to the time ordered. It is clear that the parties 
agreed that Wynn would serve no time in the Utah State Prison as a result of his pleas in the 
state case (R. 130, 179-80, 182, 183), and that Judge Reese agreed prior to the entry of the 
pleas to facilitate this agreement, as he delayed entering sentence in the state case until after 
Wynn surrendered to federal prison (R. 543: 3, R. 184). Yet at sentencing, trial counsel failed 
to ensure that Wynn would serve no time in state prison. Trial counsel did not ask Judge 
Reese to refrain from imposing a prison sentence in the state case, or argue that Judge Reese 
could have imposed probation to facilitate the collection of restitution. Counsel failed to 
assert the Utah law that authorizes criminal courts to extend court probation indefinitely 
until all restitution is paid. See,~' State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah 1993); Utah 
Code Ann.§ 77-18-l(l0)(a)(ii)(A). And trial counsel made no motion to reduce the second 
degree felonies to third degree felonies, as he could have done under Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-
3-402, to ensure that Wynn's concurrent state sentences would run while he was in federal 
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pnson. Counsel's failure to protect Wynn from the possibility of going to state prison was 
not the product of strategy. Rather, it appears that counsel rested on the assumption that 
Wynn's nineteen month state matrix would run during his federal prison sentence (R. 182, 
330). His failure to assert the law to protect Wynn at the time of sentence was objectively 
deficient E.g. Moritzskv, supra. 
There is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result had counsel asserted the 
law on Wynn's behalf, as the whole reason Judge Reese waited to impose the state sentence 
until Wynn went to federal prison was ostensibly to ensure that Wynn went to the federal 
prison, rather than the State (R. 543: 3). 
Had trial counsel not forfeited Wynn's rights to proper resolution of his restitution 
obligations, and had counsel taken reasonable steps to ensure that the parties' agreement that 
"ani' state time would run concurrently with Wynn's federal five year sentence, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that Wynn would not be residing in the Utah State Prison at all, let 
alone with a current parole date of August 24, 2023, unless he is able to produce and pay 
$782,068.00. Thus, Wynn was prejudiced by counsel's objectively deficient performance in 
representation on the restitution and sentencing issues. 
B. THE ORDER DENYING WYNN 22(e) RELIEF IS FACTUALLY 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND LEGALLY INCORRECT. 
In assessing Wynn's 22(e) claim pertaining to the default restitution order, Judge 
Parker made clear legal and factual errors. On one hand, he ruled that he had no jurisdiction 
to grant relief under rule 22(e) (R. 506). In footnote 1 of the same page, however, he 
intimated that Rule 22(e) does apply to Wynn's claims, and that therefore Wynn could not 
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resort to Civil Rule 60(b) for relief, as Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e) permits resort to civil rules in 
(ij criminal cases only when criminal rules and other statutes do not apply (R. 506 n.2). As is 
detailed above, Wynn maintains that 22(e) does apply. In the alternative, he seeks relief 
under 60(6 ), discussed infra. 
Judge Parker's ruling reads as if all restitution payees were among the named victims 
underlying the counts in this case (R. 506). This is clearly erroneous. The evidence to be 
~ marshaled in support of his ruling is that the restitution order names several of the people 
who were in the information and probable cause statement, both in counts that Wynn pled 
guilty to and did not plead guilty to. Wynn pled guilty to counts 1, 2, 5 and 7 (R. 126). 
According to the Information the victims of Count 1 were Vicki and Mark Fleming (R. 2) ; 
the victims of Count 2 were K. and Faye Brady (R. 2); the victim of Count 5 was Greg 
Cassat (R. 3); and the victims of Count 7 were Ryan and Peggy Stephenson (R. 4). In 
addition to ordering payment of restitution to the victims of the counts pled to, the default 
restitution order listed the following payees who were listed as victims of counts not pled to: 
Dave Cassity (R. 145), Eugene Garrett (R. 146), Teri Hunt (R. 146), and Mark Sanderson (R. 
147). Judge Parker's ruling does not account for the fact that the default restitution order 
listed the following payees who were not victims of any charged counts: Scott Barnes (R. 
145), Ryan Fish (R. 145), Wade Frey (R. 145), Kory Koontz (R. 146), Betty Little (R. 146), 
Brook Neff (R. 146), Quinn Perez (R. 146), Zandra Perkins (R. 146), Marcello Surjopolos (R. 
147), Simon Timms (R. 147), Patricia Tueller (R 147), and Fred Wagner (R. 147). Thus, 
each count in the information and probable cause statement lists a victim or victims (R. 1-
38), and twelve of the restitution payees in the order of restitution are not named in any 
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count (R. 141-147). 
Judge Parker stated that "and it appears from the sentencing transcript that 
Defendant agreed to pay full restitution." (R. 506). The sentencing transcript speaks for 
itself. The only evidence to be marshaled in support of this is that Wynn answered, ''Yes 
sir" in response to this commentary by Judge Reese: 
I'll also order that you pay full and complete restitution in an amount of at 
least $100,000, but probably as your attorney, I think in his words, were many times 
more than that, but the two of you will agree on a figure that will be presented at the 
time you surrender. Is that what you understand? 
(R. 543: 3). 
I'll impose the sentences we agreed to, two 1 to 15s to run concurrent, two 
zero to fives to run concurrent, all sentences to run concurrent with each other on 
the federal sentence. I'll order that full and complete restitution be paid and the 
amount - stipulated amount submitted by October 6th? 
1\1R. RICH [trial counsel for Wynn]: That's correct. Thank you. 
(R. 543: 5). 
Wynn's indication that he understood that the court would order full and complete 
restitution that was at least $100,000 in an amount to be agreed upon between Wynn and the 
State before Wynn went to federal prison did nothing to establish that Wynn was accepting 
responsibility for crimes other than those two which he pled guilty, or an agreement by 
Wynn to pay restitution to people who were not named as victims in the charges against 
him, and who were not named in the counts to which he pled guilty. 
Larsen is instructive in this regard. Larsen pled guilty to joyriding and possession of 
burglary tools, but never admitted to the theft of a car that caused damage to the car. In his 
presentence report, Larsen's handwritten statement acknowledged that he had stolen other 
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people's property and thereby caused them to lose their car and perhaps their life and job as 
well. Id. at ,I 2. This Court ruled that the trial court erred in imposing a restitution order for 
damage to the car Larsen admitted to joyriding in, as it was only by inference that the court 
determined that Larsen caused the damage, when in fact, he had not accepted responsibility 
for the theft or restitution. Id. at ml 5-9. In the instant matter, Wynn never said or did 
anything during the plea and sentencing hearing to indicate that he accepted responsibility 
for any crime or restitution payee aside from those involved in the counts of conviction. 
Wynn's acceding to Judge Reese's intent to order "full and complete restitution" is far too 
broad and general to sustain even an inference, let alone such a commitment by Wynn. Cf. 
In the final ruling, Judge Parker described the restitution order as requiring payment 
of $782,068, and then followed that figure with this parenthetical comment "(the original 
$100,000 plus an additional $682,068)". The parenthetical comment is clearly erroneous, as 
there is no evidence to be marshaled in support of the assertion that the order accounts for 
Wynn's.$100,000 payment. The default restitution order actually requires Wynn to pay a 
total of $728,068 and makes no mention of the original $100,000 payment (R. 141-43). 
The court clearly erred as a matter of law in reasoning that "the parties did not limit 
the restitution to only those victims representing the amended charges." (R. 506). There is 
no legal requirement for a criminal defendant to limit his restitution to the victims of counts 
underlying guilty pleas; for the law naturally limits restitution awards to the counts of 
conviction, unless there is a record of an agreement that the defendant will pay restitution 
beyond the counts of conviction. E.g. Larsen and Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302(5)(a). As a 
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matter of law, an attorney's forfeiture of a client's procedural rights, such as trial counsel's 
forfeiture of Wynn's right to an accurate determination of restitution, is not a proper 
substitute for a knowing and intelligent or valid waiver of the rights by the client See, ~' 
State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ,I 31, 137 P.3d 716; Ralphs v. McClellan, 2014 UT 36, ,I 24 
n.3, 337 P.3d 230. 
The ruling is erroneous in rejecting the claim of ineffective assistance, stating that the 
"record before this Court does not clearly reflect such a claim." (R. 506). Wynn's 
declaration is clear and unrefuted in establishing that he did not agree to pay restitution 
beyond the counts of conviction (R. 186), and that the parties agreed that Wynn should 
serve no time in the Utah State Prison (R. 180, 182). As explained above, counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective in failing to assert the law on Wynn's behalf at sentencing so that 
he was protected from serving time in the state prison, and in failing to object to the 
unlawful restitution order that exceeded what Wynn owed by hundreds and thousands of 
dollars. 
The ruling is legally erroneous in concluding that the restitution order in this case is 
one that the judgment of conviction authorizes and is not manifestly illegal (R. 506). As 
explained above, the restitution award is manifestly illegal, as it requires Wynn to pay 
restitution not only to victims of counts to which Wynn never pled guilty, but also, to several 
people who were never victims in counts pled in this case. Wynn did not agree to pay 
restitution beyond the amounts owed to the victims of the counts to which he pled guilty (R. 
186), and thus the order of restitution is manifestly illegal under Larsen and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-38a-302. The judgment of conviction does nothing to ameliorate this legal error. While 
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IS'.1 .. 
the order is correct in noting that Wynn agreed to pay full restitution (R. 506), there is no 
~ basis in law or fact to interpret "full restitution" as if Wynn agreed to pay restitution to' 
payees other than those underlying his pleas. 
In denying relief under 22(e), Judge Parker ruled that 22(e) does not permit the fact 
intensive analysis required to determine Wynn's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
stemming from counsel's failing to protect Wynn from being held in state prison following 
his federal five year sentence (R. 505). This ruling is incorrect, as the relevant facts did not 
require resolution. Wynn set forth the facts under oath in the declarations of the federal 
prosecutor involved in the case and Wynn (R. 179-187) along with the remainder of his 
pleadings, exhibits and the court record, and the State presented no contrary declarations or 
evidence for resolution. 
Rule 22(e) is broad enough to allow for factual resolutions necessary to reach claims 
such as Wynn's that the imposition of his sentence involved constitutional error. In 
State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, 2015 UT LEXIS 129, the court explained that 
22(e) motions properly resolve "facial constitutional challenges that do not implicate a fact 
intensive analysis." Houston at ,r,r 18. and State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15,274 P.3d 919, 
is to the same effect. See Prion, ,r 20. But in addressing constitutional issues under 22(e), 
courts are expected to refer to relevant facts. As the Houston court explained, 
In this context, a fact-intensive analysis is one in which "the pertinent legal facts" are 
disputed or unclear. But where there is a facial constitutional attack, the court need 
not delve into the record or make findings of fact. Instead, the court is tasked with 
resolving a legal issue. But that does not mean the analysis will be easy or devoid of 
any reference to facts. As the opinions in the present case demonstrate, analysis of a 
purely legal question is often difficult and warrants rigorous debate. The rule we 
articulate here is not untenable just because it requires hard work by the court. 
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Id. at ,I 27. There are many kinds of constitutional and other sentencing errors, some of 
which do not involve constitutional challenges to statutes, some of which will necessarily 
require factual analysis, which may addressed through 22(e). For instance, in State v. Knopf, 
2015 UT App 223, 2015 UT App LEXIS 238, under rule 22(e), this Court affirmed the trial 
court's imposition of a stalking injunction in a criminal case after the sentence was imposed, 
even though the stalking statute required a hearing as to the terms of the stalking injunction. 
Id. at ,I,I 10-11, 16. And in State v. Apadaca, 2015 UT App 212, 358 P.3d 1124, the Court 
considered whether the trial court violated Apadaca's right to allocution at sentencing before 
finding that his sentence was not imposed illegally under 22( e). Id. at 11 9 and 11. 
The facts underlying Wynn's case were clear and undisputed and were established the 
court record, including the sworn declarations of Wynn and the federal prosecutor (R. 179-
188). Because this was not a fact intensive case, but instead required legal rulings to correct 
a patently illegal sentence that was also illegally imposed, this Court should reverse and 
remand for correction of Wynn's patently illegal sentence (the restitution order), and illegally 
imposed sentence (the sentence imposed through ineffective assistance of counsel), under 
Rule 22(e). 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER RELIEF FROM THE DEFAULT 
RESTITUTION ORDER UNDER UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
A. WYNN IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b ). 
Rule 60(b) grants trial courts broad discretion to set aside default judgments. E.g. 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,I54, 150 P.3d 480. Timely filed motions for relief should 
be liberally granted so that our courts' rulings rest on the merits, rather than technicalities. 
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Id. Subsection (b)(6) of rule 60 is properly applied to remedy instances of egregious 
{I@ ineffective assistance resulting in default judgments, such as was involved in the entry of the 
restitution order in this case. See Menzies, ,r,I 64 and 78. A default judgment is 
properly set aside if motion for relief is .filed in a reasonable amount of time, if a subsection 
of rule 60(b) applies, and if the defaulted party has a meritorious defense to the judgment; 
finding that default of capital post-conviction case qualified as willful or grossly negligent 
@ misconduct justifying relief under 60(b)(6). Id. 
The motion seeking relief from the restitution order was filed in a reasonable amount 
of time, less than two months from Wynn's learning of the contents of the restitution 
pleadings and order and the ostensible basis for the restitution award. Wynn has a 
meritorious defense to the default restitution order, as it encompasses restitution for people 
who were not named victims in the counts to which he pled guilty, and outside the criminal 
charges entirely, without an agreement from him to pay this restitution. This violates basic 
statutory and common law on restitution. E.g., See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302; State 
v. Larsen, 2009 UT App 293, 221 P.3d 277 (reversing restitution order that exceeded 
defendant's guilty plea and was unsupported by his agreement to pay restitution for conduct 
beyond his guilty plea). Because the restitution order is factually inaccurate, it deviates from 
the constitutional due process requirement of accuracy in sentencing. See ~ State v. 
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993), and Utah Code Ann.§ 77-18-1(6)(a). Sentences 
that are premised on information that is not reasonably reliable and accurate violate due 
process of law and are unconstitutional under Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution. E.g., 
State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, if 34, 31 P.3d 615. 
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As detailed above, trial counsel's defaulting and forfeiture of Wynn's rights in the 
restitution resolution process constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Particularly given 
counsel's abandoning his client with the default restitution ruling that leaves Wynn unjustly 
· owing hundreds of thousands of dollars in criminal restitution, and trapped in the prison 
until he pays it, counsel's ineffectiveness is sufficiently egregious to merit relief under rule 
60(6)(6). Compare Menzies, supra (attorney's defaulting significant procedural rights and 
failing to accurately communicate with client in capital post-conviction merited relief under 
60(6)). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S 60(6) ANALYSIS IS LEGALLY 
INCORRECT AND FACTUALLY CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
1. The Motion was Timely. 
Judge Parker first found the motion for relief from the restitution order was not 
timely, under the analysis found in Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259, 261 (Utah App 1992). 
This analysis requires consideration of "'such factors as the interest in finality, the reason for 
the delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and 
prejudice to the other parties."' R. 507, quoting Maertz; see also Menzies, ,r 65. 
But the court did not consider all of those factors, and instead perfunctorily ruled 
that Wynn had not explained why he did not learn of the restitution order issued in 2008, 
until he learned the amount of the order in his 2013 parole hearing and does not appear to 
have pursued relief diligently (R. 507). Assuming that this ruling is viewed as a factual 
finding, because it is phrased in the negative, the evidence cannot be marshaled in support 
thereof. Wynn's declaration actually does explain that he had no legal training, did not know 
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how restitution was to be calculated, and was relying on his trial counsel to advocate for him 
~ in the restitution calculations (R. 182 ml 5 and 6). It was only when present counsel found 
the default restitution order in the district court file and then mailed it to Wynn in December 
of 2014 that Wynn learned that his trial lawyer had not responded to the state's proposed 
restitution order, and that the proposed order that entered as a result of this default required 
Wynn to pay restitution to people who were not victims in the counts he pled guilty to, and 
to people who were not victims in his state case, despite the fact that he had never agreed to 
paying anyone but the victims in the counts to which he had pled guilty (R. 186 ml 21-22). 
The prosecutors refused to provide discovery, and took the position that Judge Parker had 
no authority to order the State to provide discovery (R. 454-55). Trial counsel for Wynn and 
the actual trial prosecutor did not respond to present counsel's inquiries (R. 544: 7). 
Particularly given the lackluster performance of the officers of the court, Wynn, a lay person 
who has been in prison since 2008, is not properly barred from the courts for failing to 
advocate for himself. See Menzies, ,I,I 77 (unknowing criminal defendant is not properly 
held accountable when attorney blatantly disregards professional obligations and harms the 
client's interest). 
The court also concluded without explanation that interests in finality outweigh 
Wynn's interest in vacating the restitution order (R. 508). As is detailed herein, consideration 
of this and all of the factors identified in Maertz and Menzies confirms that Wynn's 60(b) 
motion was timely. 
a. Interest in Finality 
There is no interest in finality of the erroneous default restitution order, which serves 
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no one's interest. The prosecutors agreed that a sentence of five years in federal prison 
would be adequate punishment (R. 1 79-182), and the trial court accommodated the goal of 
avoiding the state prison by delaying the entry of the final sentence until after Wynn went to 
federal prison (R. 543: 3, R. 184). Yet the taxpayers are currently paying approximately 
$27,117 per year to house Wynn at the current rate, see 
http://corrections.utah.gov/index.php ?option =com content&view= article&id = 888: faqs&c 
atid=2&Itemid=119#cost, and will likely to continue paying at least that much annually for 
ten years more than was agreed upon between the parties. The point of the plea bargain 
between Wynn and the State was for Wynn to be out working and paying restitution 
immediately after he served his federal five year sentence (R. 1 79-182). As Wynn is being 
held in the prison, where he cannot pay meaningful restitution (R. 186 ,I 24), none of the 
victims are being repaid aside from those who benefitted from his initial $100,000 payment 
when he pied and was sentenced. The likelihood of his being able to pay restitution in the 
State case is significantly diminished by the Board's order, which contemplates that Wynn 
will be paroled when he is sixty-nine years old, when Wynn will have served the entirety of 
his state sentence (R. 185, 360-61). Thus, there is no interest in the finality of the default 
restitution order. 
b. Reason for Delay 
The reason for the delay is that no one provided Wynn with a copy of the default 
restitution order or advised him as to its illegal nature until present counsel went to district 
court and copied the order and mailed it to Wynn in December of 2014 (R. 186, R. 544: 5-6, 
18). Wynn was trusting in his trial counsel to handle the restitution issues, and did not know 
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how restitution was to be calculated (R. 182 ,I,I 5 and 6) and was not in a position to be 
~ paying restitution when he was in prison as he had no means of paying while incarcerated (R. 
186 ,I 24). Until Wynn received the default order from present c~unsel in December of 2014 
and learned that it illegally held him responsible for paying people other than those 
underlying the counts he pled to and had agreed to pay, he had no reason to know that the 
restitution order was amiss (R. 181-187). The delay between the court's signing the default 
~ restitution order and Wynn's receiving it and acting on it was not at all to Wynn's advantage. 
He is not properly faulted for his attorneys' failure to challenge and communicate the court 
order to him sooner. 
c. Practical Ability to Learn of Grounds Earlier 
Wynn's practical ability to learn of the grounds sooner is explained by the fact that his 
counsel did not communicate the order or its illegal nature to him sooner, and he was 
trusting that his trial lawyer had advocated properly for him with regard to restitution issues 
when he was originally incarcerated in federal prison, and upon his release was then 
transferred directly to the Utah State Prison (R. 181-187). The default restitution order was 
not scanned in or on the internet and was not available to Wynn until present counsel went 
to Third District Court to obtain a copy of it (R. 186, R. 544: 5-6, 18). 
d. Prejudice to the State 
The State has never claimed that it would be prejudiced by correcting the default 
restitution order, nor could it make a credible argument of prejudice. The State has no 
legitimate interest in enforcing an illegal restitution order, particularly when the illegal 
restitution order has the demonstrated effect of defeating the plea agreement entered into by 
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the State in the first place, wherein Mr. Wynn would be free and working to pay the 
restitution upon the completion of his five-year federal sentence (R. 179-182). Rather, the 
State's interest is for its prosecutors to integriously honor both the letter and the spirit of the 
plea agreement, as due process of law requires. See,~' United States v. Cudjoe, 534 F.3d 
1349, 1356 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that government violated both the letter and spirit of the 
plea agreement, in violation of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). Thus, 
Wynn should not be denied 60(b)(6) relief under the Maertz and Menzies factors. 
2. Rule 60(b)(6) Applies to Wynn's Claims oflneffective 
Assistance and Gross Negligence 
Judge Parker also denied relief under 60(b)(6), finding that under Menzies, Wynn's 
claims of ineffective assistance in the sentencing proceedings were not sufficiently 
exceptional to justify 60(b)(6) relief (R. 507). The court erred as a matter of law in this 
regard. As explained above, trial counsel's wholesale forfeiture of the restitution proceedings 
constitutes ineffective assistance and goes beyond negligence or inadvertence. Thus, it is 
remediable under 60(b)(6). Compare Menzies, ,I 75 (rule 60(b)(6) is a proper remedy for 
ineffective assistance and representation that is willful or grossly negligent, rather than 
inadvertent or simply negligent). 
3. Rule 60(b) Does Not Conflict with the PCRA With Regard to 
Wynn's Default Restitution Order. 
Judge Parker ruled that Wynn could not resort the 60(b) for relief because the rule 
conflicts with the PCRA, inasmuch as§ 78B-9-102(1) indicates that the PCRA is the only 
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remedy for petitioners who have exhausted all other avenues for relief and § 78B-9-104 
permits PCRA petitions based on unconstitutional convictions or sentences, or claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel (R. 507). Judge Parker reasoned that under Kell v. State, 
2012 UT 25, 125, 285 P.3d 1133, the availability of the PCRA to address Wynn's claims 
foreclosed his resorting to 60(b)(6) (R. 507-08). The court was legally in error in this regard 
as well. 
Neither the availability of the PCRA nor the Kell decision bars Wynn from resorting 
to 60(b)(6). In Kell, the supreme court affirmed on alternate grounds the trial court~s denial 
of 60(b) relief from the trial court's order dismissing Kell's post-conviction petition, which 
order had already withstood appellate review in the supreme court Kell reiterates that 
default judgments are generally properly set aside under 60(b)(6). Id. at 119. As to non-
default judgments, Kell does not hold that 60(b) motions are completely unavailable. 
Rather, it is only when 60(b) is used to accomplish what the Post Conviction Remedies Act 
forbids that the 60(b) relief is unavailable as to non-default judgments. See id. at 128. The 
State has never contended that the PCRA would bar Wynn's claims for relief. Rather, the 
State repeatedly argued as if Wynn should be pursuing relief by challenging his pleas under 
the PCRA (~ R. 394, 463). 
Wynn is not trying to circumvent the PCRA. Rather, he is trying to obtain relief 
from a default judgment that entered through ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Rule 
60(b)(6) provides an appropriate avenue for relief. See Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 154, 
150 P.3d 480; Kell, 1 19. 
4. Civil Rule 81(e) Does not Disqualify Wynn from 60(b) 
41 
Relief. 
In footnote 1,Judge Parker intimated that 60(b) is not applicable in a criminal case, 
because Utah R. Crim. P. 22 and the PCRA are applicable to Wynn's claims, and thus, Rule 
81(e) does not permit Wynn to resort to the civil rule (R. 506 n.1). The court was legally 
incorrect. Review of Rule 81 (e) and the cases applying the civil rules to criminal cases 
through civil rule 81(e) confirms that Rule 60(b) is available in this criminal case. Rule 81(e) 
provides: 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. -- These rules of procedure shall also govern in 
any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, 
provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any starutory or 
constitutional requirement. 
Thus, under the plain terms of rule 81(e), it is mandatory for the civil rules to apply in "any 
aspect" of criminal proceedings that are not addressed by starute or rule, with the proviso 
that application of the civil rule does not conflict 'With constitutional law or statute. See id. 
The whole purpose of 81(e) is "to unify civil and criminal procedure in Utah except where a 
statute or rule provides otherwise for criminal cases." State v. Anderson, 796 P.2d 1114, 
1116 (Utah 1990). By virtue of Rule 81 (e), "the rules of civil procedure govern in criminal 
proceedings where not inconsistent with applicable rule or statute." Brigham City v. 
Valencia, 779 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah App. 1989). 
State v. Gonzalez, 2005 UT 72, 125 P.3d 878, provides an example. The Utah. 
Supreme Court held that the notice requirements for subpoenas set forth in civil rule 45 
apply in criminal cases, despite the fact that there is a rule of criminal procedure, rule 14, that 
is specific to the topic of subpoenas, which contains no such notice requirements. The 
42 
court's discussion of how rule 81(e) analysis functions is instiuctive here. The Gonzalez 
court compared tl1e civil and criminal rule, finding that the civil rule was more specific and 
comprehensive, and that while less specific, the criminal rule intimated that some type of 
notice was required, and that the notice provided e>..1)licitly by the civil rule was consonant 
with the constitutional demands of due process of law. Id. at ,I,I 30-32. Moreover, the court 
recognized that the public policy served by the notice requirements in the civil rule was 
equally important in the context of tl1e criminal law. Id. at 1 33. 
While Wynn is asserting criminal rules 30(b) and 22( e) to obtain relief in this case, he 
maintains in the alternative that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). This rule is a critical 
remedy for default orders entered through ineffective assistance of counsel and gross 
negligence of counsel. See Menzies, 154, and Kell, ,I 19, supra. It has been applied in at least 
one analogous criminal case with the approval of the Utah Supreme Court. See State v. 
Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994).4 Applying 60(b) in this case does not conflict and 
is not inconsistent with any other rule or statute, including the PCRA. Accordingly, 81(e) 
does not bar application of 60(b) in Wynn's case. See Valencia, supra. 
The ultimate conclusion of the court regarding 60(6) was that the interest in finality 
outweighed Wynn's interest in relief from the order (R. 508). As detailed above, there is no 
legitimate interest in finality in the default restitution order. It se.nres no one's interest As 
4 In Parker, a criminal defendant filed a motion for return of his fees paid to a community 
correctional center as part of his probation, because he prevailed on appeal and the original 
criminal case was dismissed. He specified no rule in filing this motion, but argued that it was 
proper under 22(e). This Court opted to view this motion for return of fees as having been 
filed under 60(b ), rather than 22( e) because the sentence was lawful at the time it was 
imposed, and it was the reversal of the conviction on a suppression issue that resulted in the 
reversal of the conviction and dismissal of the case. 
43 
the court recognized in Kell, "finality, 'standing alone, is unpersuasive in the inteq,retation 
of a provision whose whole purpose is to make an exception to finality."' Id. at ,i 16. 
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER THE DISTRICT COURT TO COMPEL 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE TO FULFILL ITS 
DISCOVERY DUTIES. 
The court denied Wynn's motion to compel discovery in one sentence: "Having 
determined that this Court does not have jurisdiction, Defendant's Motion for Discovery is 
denied." (R. 508). This sentence is contradictory to the portion of the court's denial of relief 
under rule 30(b ), wherein the court ostensibly exercised its jurisdiction and reached the 
merits and found there was no error in the default restitution order (R. 508). 
As explained more fully in Points I through III of this brief, supra, the court did have 
ongoing jurisdiction to correct Wynn's illegally imposed sentence, including the default 
restitution order, pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) and 22 (e). Both of these rules 
recognize the courts' power to act "any time." And as explained above, the court also had 
jurisdiction to correct the illegally imposed sentence and restitution order under Civil Rule 
60(b)(6). Consistent with the premise that "'[a] court always has jurisdiction to consider its 
own jurisdiction[,]'" Western Water LLC v. Olds, 2008 UT 18, ,i 42, 184 P.3d 578 (citation 
omitted), the State conceded that the court at least has jurisdiction to consider its 
jurisdiction, in consenting to a hearing for oral arguments (R. 456 n.1). 
Wynn's right to discovery was certainly intact during the pendency of his motions, for 
the State has ongoing discovery obligations. E.g. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b). 
Federal courts interpreting federal constitutional law recognize that the Government's duty 
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to provide the defendant with exculpatory and mitigating evidence is a continuing one, ~' 
Pennsvlvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987), and that fairness dictates that the 
prosecution provide exculpatory evidence to the defendant through post-conviction 
proceedings. See,~' Monroe v. Butler, 690 F.Supp. 521, 525-26 (E.D. La. 1988). See also, 
~' Kyles v. Whitley. 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (applying~ to evidence revealed in post-
conviction); Banks v. Dredke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (permitting Brady claim to be raised in 
~ federal post-conviction despite its not being raised in state post-conviction proceeding). Cf. 
Scott v. Mullin, 303 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2002) (permitting petitioner to raise Brady 
claim for the first ti.me in federal post-conviction because prosecution had not disclosed 
exculpatory evidence until after the direct appeal). Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 similarly 
requires the prosecution to produce exculpatory evidence and certain categories of 
inculpatory evidence on an ongoing basis. See id. 
The prosecution's discovery duties are in place because the prosecution team members 
have natural and easy access to the info1mation that is essential to the understanding of their 
cases and the functioning of the adversary process. See,~' State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 
788 (Utah 1984); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987). Courts are expected to 
order prosecutors to produce discovery when it is necessary to the defense, in order to ''level 
the playing field" that is otherwise quite slanted, so that the truth may be ascertained. See, 
~' State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677, 689-90 (Utah App. 1992).5 
5 In State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, ,r 15, 974 P.2d 279, the Utah Supreme Court took issue with 
another decision cited in Mickelson, United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967 (3d. Cir. 1991 ), 
which ruled that the prosecution has a duty to search through the files of all government 
agencies in responding to discovery requests. The court of appeals reiterated Pliego's 
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As the court exercised its jurisdiction to deny Wynn 30(6) relief on the merits (R. 
508), and as the court had jurisdiction under rules 30(b), 22(e) and 60(b)(6), the court had 
jurisdiction to order the State to provide discovery to the defense so the adversary system 
would function properly and the court's order would be correct. CT. Mickelson. 
This Court should reverse the court's ruling that it had no jurisdiction to compel the 
State to provide discovery. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse all aspects of the lower court's ruling and remand for relief 
from the illegal restitution order and illegally imposed sentence. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of December, 2015. 
disapproval of Perdomo and its underlying concept mentioned in Mickelson, in State v. 
Sprye, 2001 UT App 75, ,r 12, 21 P.3d 675. N.lickelson otherwise remains valid. 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALTLAKECOUNTY,STATEOFUTAH 
SALT LAKE DEP AR'IMENT 
RULING AND ORDER 
DENNIS TERRY WYNN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 061906774 
Judge Paul B. Parker 
Before the Court are three motions filed by Defendant First, on January 30, 2015, 
Defendant filed a Rule 22( e) motion for review of illegal sentence, styled as 'Motion for Relief 
from Sentence Imposed in Violation of Wynn's Constitutional Rights to Effective Assistance of 
Counsel and Due Process in Sentencing and Request for Evidentiary Hearing' ("Motion for 
Relief'). Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion for Relief on March 13, 2015. Defendant 
filed a Reply in support of the Motion for Relief on March 20, 2015. Defendant argues that 
"Wynn's sentence was illegally imposed through ineffective assistance of counsel." Plaintiff 
argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction because the sentence is not illegal and that the 
Defendant is in reality challenging the plea, which must be done under the Post-Conviction · 
Remedies Act ("PCRA"). 
On March 20, 2015, Defendant filed the second motion, a 'Motion to Consider Motion 
for Relief from Sentence Imposed in Violation of Wynn's Constitutional Rights to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and Due Process in Sentencing as a Rule 60(b) and/or a Rule 30(a) 
Motion, and Incorporated Memorandum' ("Motion to Consider"). Plaintiff filed an Opposition 
to the Motion to Consider on April 3, 2015. Defendant filed a Reply in support of the Motion to 
Consider on April 5, 2015. Defendant requests consideration of the Motion for Relief under 
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 30(b) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Plaintiff 
argues that Defendant has failed to show clerical error justifying a 30(b) Utah R. Crim. P. 
correction. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) Utah R. 
Civ. P. due to untimeliness of the motion, lack of diligence in filing the motion, and because a 
Ru.le 60(b) motion cannot be used to evade what is properly a PCRA action. 
Also on March 20, 2015, Defendant filed the third motion, a 'Motion and Request for 
Discovery' ("Request for Discovery''). Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Request for Discovery 
on April 3, 2015. Defendant filed a Reply in support of the Request for Discovery on April 5, 
2015. 
This Court heard oral argument on May 4, 2015. Having considered the papers, oral 
argument, relevant law, and for good cause, the Court now rules as follows. Defendant's Motion 
for Relief under Rule 22(e) is DENIED. The Court has considered Defendant's Motion for 
Relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and Utah R Crim. P. 30(b). Defendant's Motion for Relief is 
DENIED under 60(b) URCP, and Defendant's Motion for Relief is DENIED under 30(b) 
URCrP. Defendant's Request for Discovery is also DENIED. 
BACKGROUND 
In 2006, the State of Utah charged Defendant with twelve second-degree felonies and 
seven third-degree felonies for securities fraud, theft, witness tampering, abuse of a vulnerable 
adult, and pattern of unlawful activity. By plea agreement, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to 
two counts of second-degree felony securities fraud and two counts of third-degree felony 
securities fraud. On August 25, 2008, Defendant signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel ("Statement"). The tenns of the Statement included the 
agreement between Defendant and the prosecuting attorney that: 
(I) Defendant will serve any state prison sentence concurrent with his 
federal prison time 
(2) Defendant shall pay $100,000 to state at sentencing. Final amount of 
restitution to be detennined by Oct 6, as between counsel 
Statement, at 5. Counsel for Defendant at sentencing explained that Defendant would be 
stipulating to two 1-15 year, and two 0-5 year indeterminate prison sentences. In the plea 
colloquy the Defendant acknowledged that he understood the rights he was giving up and that he 
understood the penalties. Defendant also acknowledged that he read and understood the 
Statement. 
The Court followed the recommendation of the parties and imposed a sentence of two 1-
15 year prison terms and two 0-5 year prison terms, all to run concurrent, and to run concurrent 
with the expected federal sentence. The Court also imposed a $100,000 initial restitution at 
sentencing as well as a yet-to-be-determined full and complete restitution amount, which 
Defendant agreed would be "many times more" than the $100,000. Neither the plea colloquy 
nor the Statement limits the restitution_ to the victims of the specific counts to which Defendant 
entered guilty pleas. On October 6, 2008, the prosecutor filed a Request for an Order of 
Restitution submitting the final amount of$782,068 (the original $100,000 plus an additional 
$682,068). Defendant and Defendant's counsel did not object to the proposed final restitution 
amount or the Request for Order of Restitution. On October 23, 2008, the Court entered the 
Order of Restitution in the full and complete amount of$782, 068.63. 
At a May 2, 2013 parole hearing, a hearing officer recited the details of the restitution 
order to Defendant indicating the remaining amount of $682,086.63 ($782,086.63 less the 
$100,000 paid at sentencing). Defendant stated that he had not seen the figures, but that "it 
~ . 
I 
sounds correct" Defendant's Ex. 11 at 7. When the parole officer asked Defendant ifhe had 
paid in.ore than the $100,000, Defendant respo~ded: "not that rm aware of." Id. The hearing 
officer also indicated that the restitution represented 20 separate victims with losses ranging from 
$7,000 to $107,000 and asked whether that "pretty well sum[s] it up?" Id. Defendant responded 
that he didn't have this in his packet, but stated "I think that sums it up." Id. at 8. After the 
hearing, on May 14, 2013, the Board of Pardons fixed Defendant's expiration date at the 
maximum 15 years. 1 On January 30, 2015, Defendant filed the present Motion for Relief. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Sentence Length and Restitution 
Defendant argues that Defendant's sentence was illegally imposed through ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The Court may "correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22( e ). An illegal sentence is one that "is 
ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally 
contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of 
the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction did not authorize. 11 State v. 
1'hurman, 2014 UT App 119, 12,327 P.3d 1240. Generally an illegal sentence occurs where the 
sentencing court does not have jurisdiction, or where the sentence is beyond the authorized 
statutory range. State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, n. 1, 48 P .3d 228. 
-While the Court may review an illegal sentence at any time, "it must be 'narrowly 
circumscn"bed' to prevent abuse. 11 Id 1 5. As a result, the alleged illegal sentence must be a 
''patently'' illegal sentence, State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995), or a "manifestly" 
illegal sentence, Telford, 2002 UT 51 at ,r 5, 48 P.3d 228. Additionally, Rule 22(e) presupposes 
a valid conviction and cannot be used to challenge the underlying conviction by challenging the 
sentence. State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ,I 9,232 P.3d 1008. Toe Utah Supreme Court has 
affirmed that Rule 22( e) "encompasses facial constitutional challenges to the sentence that do no 
implicate a fact-inte~ive analysis." State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ,i 18. The Houston court also 
made it clear that Rule 22( e) allows facial constitutional challenges to the sentence but not as-
applied inquiries. Id. at, 26. Through a facial constitutional challenge, "the challenger asserts 
that the statute is so constitutionally flawed that 'no set of circumstances exists under which the 
[statute] would be valid'." State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App 326, -iJ 27, 100 P.3d 231 (alterations in 
original). 
1 The Board of Pardons also noted that they would consider an earlier release date upon verified completion of all 
CAP programming and upon verification that restitution is paid in full. Board of Pardons Decision Letter, dated 
May 14, 2013. 
Defendant argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at sentencing when 
counsel did not "ensure that Wynn would serve no time in state prison." Motion for Relief, at 8. 
To support this, Defendant asserts that the parties agreed that Defendant would serve no time in 
the Utah State Prison as a result of his pleas in this state case. All a result, Defendant argues, 
Defendant's sentence is unconstitutional as the product of ineffective ~sistance of counsel. At 
the sentencing hearing, the parties expressed their recommendation that the four state sentences 
(two, 1-15 year sentences, and two, 0-5 year sentences) would run concurrent with one another 
and that they would run concurrent with the anticipated five~year federal sentence. The Court 
followed the recommendation of the parties and sentenced Defendant to two 1-15 year terms and 
two 0-5 year terms in Utah State Prison, all running concurrently and running concurrently with 
the federal sentence. Additionally, the Court agreed not to issue a commitment until Defendant 
reported to the federal commitment. 
Defendant asserts that he agreed to enter the guilty pleas on the understanding that he 
would serve no more than the five year federal term on the state sentences, meaning he would 
spend no time in state prison. As long as the actual sentence is within the applicable 
indeterminate range, the Board of pardons has broad authority and discretion "to detennine if, 
when, and under what conditions an inmate may be released on parole.'' Kelly v. Board of 
Pardons, 2012 UT App 279, 1,r 3-4, 288 P.3d 39, 41. This Court cannot review the Board's 
decision to retain Defendant for the full 15-year term. Utah Code Ann.§ 77-27-5(3). Defendant 
has not challenged the sentences themselves, applicable as a result of the entry of guilty pleas. 
Rather, Defendant asserts that ineffective assistance of counsel renders the sentences illegal. 
Nothing in the record supports the assertion that Defendant could not serve time in State prison. 
Neither the parties nor the court stated that Defendant would not serve time in state prison. 
Defendant acknowledged, in the 'Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and 
Certificate of Counsel' the maximum sentences of 15 years on counts I and II and a maximum 
sentence of 5 years on counts V and VII. Statement at 1. The sentences were indeterminate. 
Defendant also acknowledged in the Statement: "I know the maximum sentence that may be 
imposed for each crime to which I am pleading guilty." Statement at 4. Defendant further 
acknowledged tQa,t the trial judge was not bound by any agreement between Defendant and 
Plaintiff. Statement at 5. Defendant has failed to show that the sentence is manifestly illegal 
with regard to sentence length and Defendant has likewise not asserted any facial constitutional 
challenge to the sentences. · 
Defendant also asserts that the alleged actions or inactions of trial counsel with regard to 
the restitution constituted ineffective assistance in violation of the Defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. Defendant does not challenge any applicable statute or rule as 
facially unconstitutional and neither does Defendant challenge any applicable statute or rule as 
unconstitutional as-applied. Rather Defendant asserts that trial counsel performed deficiently by 
failing to challenge the State's proffered final restitution amount. As to ineffective assistance of 
counsel, there is a strong presumption in favor of the objective reasonableness of defense 
counsel's performance. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,689 (1984), 104 S.Ct. 2052; 
State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70,119,321 P.3d 1136. This presumption requires Defendant to 
~.· 
overcome the presumption that "under [all] the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, 'iI 19, 321 P.3d 1136 (amendnient in 
original). Additionally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims present mixed questions of law 
and fact. State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247,119, 9 P.3d 777, 782. Even if Defendant's 
ineffective assistance claim fell within the purview of Rule 22( e ), the Defendant has not shown 
that the claim can be easily corrected without the need for fact-intensive analysis. See State v. 
Houston, 2015 UT 40, ,r 18. 
Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not fall within the narrow 
parameters of Rule 22(e) review because a fact-intensive analysis is required to detennine 
Defendant's claims. Rule 22(e) does not permit such a review. Additionally, Defendant raises 
no issues with regard to ambiguity in the time or manner of serving the sentence or uncertainty 
as to the substance of the sentence, and Defendant has not shown the sentence itself to be 
otherwise illegal. Defendant's sentences are not manifestly illegal. On these bases, Defendant's 
Rule 22( e) claims are denied. 
b. Restitution for convicted offenses and any other sums defendant agrees to pay 
Defendant next challenges the restitution order .as one which the judgment of conviction 
does not authorize because it includes restitution to victims who are not part of the amended 
counts. When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages "the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as 
provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as 
part of a plea disposition." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38A-302(1). In determining restitution for an 
offense, "the offense shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution." Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38A-
302(5)(a). Utah defines restitution as "full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages 
to a victim,'' Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38A-102(1 l), and defines pecuniary damages as "all 
demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a 
civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities," 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38A-102(6). Criminal activities are "any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-3 BA-102(2). Read together, the court may enter an order for restitution covering full 
pecuniary damages, which include amounts covering defendant's criminal activities, and such 
criminal activities are broadly defined to include criminal conduct for which the defendant 
admits responsibility (even without admitting to committing the criminal conduct). 
On August 25, 2008, the Court sentenced Defendant and, with regard to restitution, the 
Court stated: 
I'll also order that [Defendant] pay full and complete restitution in an 
amount of at least $100,000, but probably as your attorney, I think in his 
J •' 
I 
words, were many times more than that, but the two of you will agree on a 
figure that will be presented at the time you surrender. Is that what you 
understand? 
Sentencing Transcript at 3. Defendant responded, "yes sir." Id. Later in the sentencing hearing 
the Court reaffirmed: "I'll order that full and complete restitution be paid and the amount -
stipulated amount submitted by October 6th (2008]." Id. at 5. On October 6, 2008, the 
Prosecutor submitted the restitution request for $782,068.63, which included restitution for the 
amended counts to which Defendant entered pleas of guilty, as well as the remaining counts that 
were dismissed by plea agreement. The restitution statute authorizes the court to enter a 
restitution order for an amount reflecting full pecuniary damages as long as the defendant agrees 
to pay and admits responsibility even if denying commission of the criminal activity. 
It is apparent from the sentencing hearing transcript that the Court intended to order 
Defendant to pay ''full and complete restitution" in an amount to be determined, but at least 
$100,000 and likely "many times more than that." It cannot be inferred that the parties agreed to 
a 'partial' or 'nominal' restitution, and the parties did not limit the restitution to only those 
victims representing the amended charges. See Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38A-102(1 l). In fact, 
Defendant agreed to pay full restitution in an amount to be later determined, and when finally 
submitted, Defendant did not object to the amount. While Defendant argues that this was due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the record before this Court does not clearly reflect such a 
claim. The Restitution Order in this case is one that the judgment of conviction authorizes, is not 
manifestly illegal, and it appears from the sentencing transcript that Defendant agreed to pay full 
restitution. 
The errors alleged by Defendant are ordinary errors regularly reviewed on appeal and 
Defendant does not assert a manifestly illegal sentence. See State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 
9, 'If 15, 84 P.3d 854, 858. Finding no illegal sentence, this Court does not have jurisdiction and 
Defendant's Rule 22(e) claim is denied. 
II. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Defendant next asserts that the order of restitution should be set aside under Rule 
60(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Defendant's Motion for relief, even if properly 
considered under Rule 60(b)(6), is untimely and is inappropriate as it conflicts with the statutory 
2 The Court notes that Defendant has not clear]y articuJated the applicability of URCP 60(b) in this criminal case. 
Both parties discuss cases in this context that deal with PCRA actions, which are civil in nature. Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-102, Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("Proceedings 1.Dlder this chapter are civil and are governed by the rules 
of civil procedure,,); See e.g. Kell v. State, 2012 UT25, 285 P.3d 1133; Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 
480; Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19,342 P.3d 182. Defendant has not fi]ed a Post-Conviction Remedies Act action, but 
the URCP may apply in criminal cases "where there is no other applicable statute or rule ... " Utah R. Civ. P. 8l(e). 
Under the circumstances, it appears as though both Rule 22(e) Utah R. Crim. P. and PCRA are applicable to address 
Defendant>s allegations. 
mandates of the PCRA. Rule 60(b) provides that the court may relieve a party of a final order or 
judgment for ... "(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
A motion for relief under 60(b )( 6) "shall be made within a reasonable time,, after entry of 
the order. Id. "What constitutes a 'reasonable time' depends upon the facts of each case, 
considering such factors as the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the 
litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties." Maertz v. 
Maertz, 827 P.2d 259,261 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (Holding that, in the interest of finality, the 
partf s action to set aside brought three and one-half years after the order was not brought within 
a reasonable time under Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). 
In this case, the Court entered the restitution order on October 6, 2008 and the Defendant 
requested the order be set aside on March 20, 2015, almost six and one-half years later. 
Defendant asserts that he first learned about the restitution order amount at the May 2013 parole 
hearing, but provides no explanation as to why he did not learn of the restitution order, filed in 
this case in October 2008, between 2008 and 2013. Defendant has provided no rationale for the 
delay in the motion to set aside and does not appear to have acted diligently to pursue a possible 
relief from judgment. 
Rule 60(b)(6), the catch-all provision, is also meant to be the exception rather than the 
rule, Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 'iJ 71, 150 P.3d 480, and should be used "only in unusual 
and exceptional circumstances." Laub v. S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass 'n, Inc., 651 P.2d 1304, 1307 
(Utah 1982). Even if applicable in this criminal case, Defendant's 60(b)(6) allegations of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing present neither Wlusual nor exceptional 
circumstances supporting this means of seeking relief. 
Additionally, the PCRA prevails "[w]here the Post-Conviction Remedies Act is in direct 
conflict with rule governing motions for relief from judgment." Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, ,r 25, 
285 P.3d 1133. The PCRA is ''the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or 
sentence for criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct 
appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102( I). As noted above, much of the discussion with regard 
to the PCRA in the instant case is speculative because Defendant has not filed a PCRA petition 
and instead seeks relief from the sentence via alternative means. While the PCRA statute does 
not apply to a Rule 22( e) motion to correct sentence, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102(2)(b ), it 
does conflict with Defendant's 60(b)(6) motion in this case. A person convicted and sentenced 
for a criminal offense may seek post-conviction relief under PCRA upon certain grounds, 
including: 
(l)(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in 
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(1 )( d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of 
the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-104. Defendant's claims for relief under 60(b)(6) are directly available 
for consideration within the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. The Kell Court stated: 
Because the PCRA allows postconviction petitions only under 
circumstances defined by statute, we foresee that 60(b) motions might be 
brought in an attempt to evade the PCRA. This is not permitted by law. 
Kell, 2012 UT 25, 'tf 24,285 P.3d 1133. Because Defendant's claims are available under the 
PCRA., they are necessarily unavailable under 60(b) in this case. Defendant's Motion for Relief 
( considered under Rule 60(b )( 6) URCP) is untimely; it does not appear that Defendant diligently 
pursued the basis for the relief he now seeks; and the interest in finality in this case outweighs 
Defendant's interests in vacating the restitution order. Defendant's Motion for Relief is denied. 
m. Rule 30(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Defendant next asserts that the restitution order entered in this case constitutes a clerical 
error, correctible under Rule 30(b) Utah R. Crim. P. A clerical mistake in judgments, orders, or 
other parts of the record, resulting from oversight or omission, may be corrected by the Court at 
any time. Rule 30(b) Utah R. Crim. P. In determhi41g whether a clerical error exists, the court 
reviews "(1) whether the order or judgment that was rendered reflects what was done or 
intended, (2) whether the error is the result of judicial reasoning and decision-making, and (3) 
whether the error is clear from the record." State v. Perkins, 2014 UT App 60,110,322 P. 3d 
1184 (quoting State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,J 14,218 P.3d 610). 
In this case, Defendant argues that the restitution order did not comport with the intent of 
the court. The court intended to enter an order representing "full and complete" restitution 
pursuant to a final restitution amount to be submitted after sentencing. The Plaintiff requested 
the restitution and, without objection, the court entered the order in the proposed amount of 
$782,068.63. There is no indication in the record that the intent of the court and the parties was 
not carried out in the Order of Restitution. The judgment reflects what was intended. The record 
does not show any clear error, judicial or clerical. As a result, there is no clerical error 
correctable through Rule 30(b) Utah R. Crim. P. Defendant's Motion for Relief ( considered 
under Rule 30(b) URCrP) is denied. 
IV. Motion for Discovery 
Having determined that this Court does not have jurisdiction, Defendant's Motion for 
Discovery is denied. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Relief is 
DENIED under Rule 22(e) Utah R. Crim. P. Defendant's Motion for Relief under 60(b) Utah R. 
Civ. P. is DENIED. Defendant's Motion for Relief under 30(b) Utah R. Crim. P. is DENIED. 
Defendant's Request for Discovery is DENIED. This ruling and order is the order of the court 
and no further order is necessary. 
DA1EDthis~of¥2015. 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
Constitution of Utah, Article I§ 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
United States Constitution Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV, § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof: are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah R.. Civ. P. 60 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the 
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such 
notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes 
may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate 
court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(6); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; ( 4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justi.fy.ing relief from the 
operation of the judgment The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and 
for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 90 days after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power 
of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed 
in these rules or by an independent action. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 81 
(a) Special statutoxy proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special statutoxy 
proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable. 
Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part of the former Code 
of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings in 
uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceedings 
subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of any 
judgment or order entered. 
(c) Application to small claims. These rules shall not apply to small claims 
proceedings except as expressly incorporated in the Small Claims Rules. 
( d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board or 
agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure in appealing from or 
obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of an administrative board or 
agency, except insofar as the specific statutory procedure in connection with any such 
appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall also govern in 
any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, 
provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory or 
constitutional requirement 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon 
request the following material or information of which he has knowledge: 
(a)(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants; 
(a)(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(a)(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(a)(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, 
mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced 
punishment; and 
(a)(S) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to adequately 
prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the 
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the 
prosecutor such infonnation as required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any 
other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be 
made available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his 
case. 
( d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures 
at least 14 days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to 
make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make 
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be 
inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. The prosecutor 
or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further dissemination of 
sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to prevent improper use of the 
information or to protect victims and witnesses from harassment, abuse, or undue 
invasion of privacy., including limitations on the further dissemination of videotaped 
interviews, photographs, or psychological or medical reports. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or 
inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further 
dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is appropriate. 
Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make such showing, in 
whole or in part, in the form. of a written statement to be inspected by the judge 
alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte showing, 
the entire text of the pa.tty's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of 
the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is b.rought to the attention of 
the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such 
party to pennit the discovery o.r inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party 
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems 
just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(h)(1) appear in a lineup; 
(h)(2) speak for identification; 
(h)(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(h)(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(h)(S) tty on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other bodily 
materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
Cl) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged 
offense. Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the 
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall 
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court, 
without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may be 
offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with 
other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such 
fu.rther sanctions as the court should deem appropriate. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than 2 nor more than 45 days 
after the verdict o.r plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may 
continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before .imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to 
make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to 
show any legal cause why sentence should not be .imposed. The prosecuting attorney 
shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material to the 
imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, 
defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to 
appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall llllpose 
sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the 
verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall 
advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any 
appeal shall be filed. 
( c) (2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as 
defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or 
in writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is unlawful for the defendant to 
possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does 
not render the plea invalid or fonn the basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
( d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment 
setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison 
shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the 
officer's return on the commitment and file it with the court 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction 
over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as 
provided by Utah Code Ann.§ 77-16a-202(1)(b), the court shall so specify in the 
sentencing order. · 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders ot other parts of the record and errors in 
the .record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
76-3-201. Definitions -- Sentences or combination of sentences allowed -- Civil 
penalties. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could .recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or 
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money 
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
inclucling earnings and medical expenses. 
( d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, and payment for expenses to a goveromental entity for extradition o.r 
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
( e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court detennines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(11) "Victim'' does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of 
them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
( c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
( d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(t) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ri) dissolve a corporation; 
(rii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) pennit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that 
the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In detettnining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the 
criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise 
ordered by the court, the defendant shall pay restitution of governmental 
ttansportation expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(ill) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
~) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a 
warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ri) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) ~) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection-(S)(a)(i) 
shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $100 for up to 100 miles a defendant is ttansported; 
(B) $200 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $350 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(n; The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant 
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported .in a single 
trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity 
in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise 
ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution 
to the county for the cost of .incarceration in the county correctional facility before 
and after sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the 
county correctional facility; and 
(h; (A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility 
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under 
Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in 
Section 64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102. 
(b) (i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount detenni:ned 
by the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate incarceration 
costs and medical and transportation costs for the county correctional facility. 
(11") The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses 
incuned by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation 
for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by 
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, 
including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
( c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this 
Subsection (6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the 
court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv) 
and shall enter the reason for its order on the record. 
( d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under 
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county 
shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of 
incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-402 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of 
which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as bcing for 
that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant to an 
alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless otherwise 
specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree 
of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to be 
for a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor and the 
sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class A misdemeanor; or 
(b) ~) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on 
probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not; 
(ri) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his probation; and 
(ill) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and a hearing if 
requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the interest of justice that the 
conviction be considered to be for a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the 
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense may 
be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this section by 
more than two degrees. 
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining or 
being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
(5) Judgment for a conviction for a lower degree of offense may not be entered if 
there remains any unpaid balance on court ordered restitution for the offense for 
which the reduction is sought. 
(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section: 
(a) a person required to register as a sex offender under Section 77-27-21.5 is not 
eligible to obtain a reduction of the conviction that requires the person to register as a 
sex offender: 
(i) while under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections; or 
(11") until the registration requirements under Section 77-27-21.5 have expired; and 
(b) a person required to register as a sex offender for the person's lifetime under 
Subsection 77-27-21.5(10)(c) may not be granted a reduction of the conviction for 
the offense or offenses that require the person to register as a sex offender. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-18-1 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence -- Pleas held in abeyance - Probation -
Supervision -- Presentence investigation -- Standards -- Confidentiality --
Terms and conditions --Termination, revocation, modification, or extension -
- Hearings -- Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a 
plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in 
Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance 
agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest., or conviction of any 
crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of 
the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in 
cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ri) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; 
or 
(fu") on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department 
is with the department. 
(11") The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court 
is vested as ordered by the court. 
(ill) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation 
standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be 
based on: 
~) the type of offense; 
(tl) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
~v) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services 
shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the 
Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review 
and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement 
the supervision and investigation standards. 
( d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to 
the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they 
consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report 
and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
( 4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to 
supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors 
or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation of class B 
misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence 
of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable 
period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from 
the department or information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The p.resentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement 
according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203describing the effect of the crime on 
the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of 
pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department 
regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
( d) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
~) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted under 
Section 77-18-1.1; and 
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender. 
(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report are protected and are not 
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the 
defendant's attomey, or the defendant if not represented by counse~ the prosecutor, 
and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged 
inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by 
the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention 
of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional 10 working days to 
resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department If after 10 working 
days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of 
relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at 
the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(!) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attomey desires to present concerning 
the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or infonnation shall be presented 
in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that 
the defendant 
( a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of b~ placed on 
probation; 
(tl) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(ili) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is legally 
liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment program in 
which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the 
court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the 
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the 
court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic 
monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the 
compensatory service program provided in Section 76-6-107.1; 
(viii') pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a 
GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the 
defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate 
prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ri) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in 
Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by 
Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-
21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with 
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and 
any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or 
upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions. 
(ri) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection 
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in 
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of 
the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil 
judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer 
responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon 
its own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why the 
defendant's failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt 
Collection, and the prosecuting attomey in writing in advance in all cases when 
termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of 
details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having 
been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation 
does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the 
probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning 
revocation of probation does not constitute service of rime toward the total 
probation tenn unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report 
with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon 
the issuance of an 
order to show cause or warrant by the court 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified 01: extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that 
the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i.) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to 
constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized 
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that 
revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order 
to show cause why the defendant's probation should not be revoked, modified, or 
extended 
( c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall 
be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ri) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(ili) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented 
by connsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
( d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the 
affidavit 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attomey 
shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(ili") The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless 
the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in the defendant's own 
behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding t:Qat the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation 
term commence anew. 
(ill) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence 
previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the 
Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State 
Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or the superintendent's designee has 
certified to the court that 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state 
hospital; 
(b) trea1ment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for 
treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports are classified protected in accordance with Title 
63G, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. 
Notwithstanding Sections 63G-2-403 and 63G-2-404, the State Records Committee 
may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report Except for 
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this 
section, the departm.ent may disclose the presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the 
department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's 
authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation 
report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the 
victim shall include only information relating to statements or materials provided by 
the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, 
or to the impact of the crime on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation 
under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-
406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, 
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in 
accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may 
order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring as described in this section until further order of the court. 
~: 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law 
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
( c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
~) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(it) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's 
compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
( d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through 
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of 
Corrections; 
(ri) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant 
and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the 
department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic 
monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the 
court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section 
either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302 
77-38a-302 Restitution criteria. (1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity 
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime 
as provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to 
make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has 
the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether 
restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as 
provided in Subsections (2) through (5). (2) In determining restitution, the court shall 
determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution. (a) "Complete 
restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused 
by the defendant (b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court 
having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal 
sentence at the time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing. (c) Complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (5). (3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or 
inappropriate under this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of 
the court record. ( 4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or 
distribution of the restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the 
issue. (5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court 
or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that 
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy., or a pattern of criminal activity, 
includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course 
of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. (b) In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, 
including: (i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or 
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; (n) the cost of necessary 
medical and .related professional services and devices relating to physical or mental 
health care, including non.medical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a 
method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; (iii) the cost of 
necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; (iv) the income lost by 
the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to 
theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the 
victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the 
offense; and (vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. (c) In determining the monetary sum and other 
conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider: (i) the factors listed 
in Subsections (S)(a) and (b); (tl) the financial resources of the defendant, as disclosed 
in the financial declaration described in Section 77-38a-204; Utah Code Page 2 (ili) 
the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other 
obligations of the defendant; (iv) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an 
installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; (v) the rehabilitative 
effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of payment; 
and (vi) other circumstances that the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. (d) (i) Except as ptovided in Subsection (S)(d)(n), the court shall 
determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all 
restitution orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after 
sentencing. (tl) Any pecuniary damages that have not been detennined by the court 
within one year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and 
Parole. (e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, 
refer an order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of 
restitution. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102 
1~:,H~il9~- Replacement of prior remedies. 
(1) This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other 
legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsection (2). 
This chapter replaces all prior remedies for review, including extraordinary or 
common law writs. Proceedings under this chapter are civil and are governed by 
the rules of civil procedure. Procedural provisions for filing and commencement 
of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence 
for a criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure; or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-104 
78B-9-104. Grounds for relief-Retroactivity of rule. 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has 
been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the 
district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or 
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation 
of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a 
statute that is in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted is 
constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the 
controlling statutory provisions; 
( d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
( e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to 
vacate the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence 
at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in 
any previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, 
and the evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise 
of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that 
was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material 
evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have 
found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence 
received; or 
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by 
the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah 
Court of Appeals after conviction and sentence became final on direct 
appeal, and that 
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the 
petitioner's conviction or sentence became final; or 
(ii) the rule decrimioaHzes the conduct that comprises the elements of 
the crime for which the petitioner was convicted. 
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the 
petitioner establishes that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome in light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, 
viewed with the evidence and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing. 
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the 
petitioner is innocent of the crime for which convicted except as provided in 
Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, 
Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence. Claims under Part 3, 
Postconviction Testing of DNA o.r Part 4, Postconviction Determination of 
Factual Innocence of this chapter may not be filed as part of a petition under 
this part, but shall be filed separately and in conformity with the provisions of 
Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA or Part 4, Postconviction Determination 
of Factual Innocence. 
